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Taking Climate Change by Storm:
Theorizing Global and Local Policy-Making in
Response to Extreme Weather Events
SONIA E. ROLLANDt
AMY PIMENTELtt
AuRooP GANGULYttt
INTRODUCTION
Mounting evidence suggests that anthropogenic climate
change leads to significant increases in the frequency,
duration, spatial extent, severity, and timing of extreme
weather and climate events.' With varying degrees of
confidence, current scientific models project a substantial
warming in temperature extremes, an increase in the
frequency of heavy precipitation, an increase in the average
tropical cyclone wind speed, an intensification of droughts,
and a rise in sea levels by the end of the 21st century.2 Floods,
droughts, and hurricanes, while more uncertain in terms of
their links to climate change, may increase risk and cause
more damage to the growing population and infrastructures
f Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center;
Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law. This research was
made possible in part thanks to a Northeastern University Tier 1
interdisciplinary research grant. The author wishes to thank Lee Breckenridge
for her helpful comments on earlier drafts.
ft Northeastern University School of Law (J.D., '14).
ttt Associate Professor, Northeastern University College of Engineering.
1. MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 4, 7 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter SREX Report], available at http://ipcc-
wg2.gov/SREX. For a discussion of the trends in the United States, see Climate
Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate
Assessment, J.M. Melillo, Terese (T.C.) Richmond, & G.W. Yohe, eds., U.S. Global
Change Research Program 35-43 (2014) [hereinafter U.S. Third National Climate
Assessment].
2. SREX Report, supra note 1, at 13-15.
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in vulnerable regions.3
"Disasters are often thought of as events occurring at a
specific location whereas climate change is thought of as a
global or regional phenomenon."4 This view is now evolving
as local disasters are recognized as having a relationship
with broader climate change dynamics.' However, "climate
change projections do not provide precise information at a
local scale."6 In other words, while scientific knowledge on the
likely occurrence and severity of extreme weather events is
improving at the global scale, that knowledge does not
translate well into local predictions.' There are some
prospects for reducing this disconnect in the future, but the
recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's 2012
SREX Report recognizes that they have not yet materialized.
By contrast, policy interventions to adapt to, or mitigate,
the impact of extreme weather events tends to be easier to
craft at the local scale, with fewer actors involved and more
pressing concerns for effectiveness, than at the continental or
global scale, where actors have too many incentives to defect
from a common undertaking: a classic collective action
problem.9
Scientific uncertainty and policy effectiveness regarding
climate change, then, appear to operate inversely. At the
global level where the scientific consensus on climate change
is the strongest, policy-makers have been the least successful
at undertaking effective action.10 At the local level, where
policy-makers are typically more able to overcome
3. See, e.g., id. at 18-19.
4. Id. at 427.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 17.
9. See Lisa Schenck, Climate Change "Crisis" - Struggling for Worldwide
Collective Action, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 319, 334 (2008) and
accompanying footnotes.
10. See generally Elke Schussler, Charles-Clemens Ruling, & Bettina B.F.
Wittneben, On Melting Summits: The Limitations of Field-Configuring Events as
Catalysts of Change in Transnational Climate Policy, 57 AcAD. OF MGMT. J. 140
(2014).
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coordination problems, the science of climate change has a
much higher degree of uncertainty. These trends are even
more accentuated with respect to the scientific
understanding of extreme climate events and the likelihood
of political coordination at various scales.
The main contribution of this Article is to theorize and
illustrate how the elements of scale, scientific uncertainty,
and collective action contribute to the success or failure of
particular types of policy. Borrowing from economics
literature, we characterize this trilateral relationship as a
"triangle of impossibilities." This Article hypothesizes that
collective action problems account in part for the paradox
that policy-makers are least able to effectively respond to the
challenge of extreme weather events at the scale where
scientific knowledge is the most accurate. A successful policy,
therefore, is one that considers and overcomes the
conundrum that the triangle of impossibilities presents. This
Article aims to help direct the scientific community towards
the types of research efforts that will positively impact the
policy sphere. For lawyers and policy-makers, this Article
will provide a guide of "best practices" that aim to overcome
the triangle of impossibilities, taking into account the lessons
learned from previously successful and unsuccessful policies.
This Article surveys literature from the sciences, law,
and policy to show that as scientific uncertainty regarding
extreme weather events decreases when we move from the
local scale to the global scale, the ability of policy-makers to
respond correspondingly decreases. In other words, while
there is fairly reliable modeling of future extreme weather
event patterns at the global scale, policy-makers have
proven, with the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), that
they are unable to agree on a world-wide basis about how to
manage climate change. By contrast, policy-makers would be
more able and willing to implement local remediation and
mitigation plans, but the scientific prediction of extreme
weather patterns at the local level is much more uncertain.
This research approach of comparing extreme weather policy
across spatial scales enables us to suggest certain policy
designs, which are based on the recent developments of
scientific modeling and the correlation between scientific
935
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uncertainty, spatial scale, and well-established political
theory on collective action.
While keeping in mind that this Article focuses on multi-
scale solutions to the difficulties of extreme weather policy-
making, helpful notes can be drawn from the literature on
domestic regulation and, in particular, from the field of
ecosystem management." This area has long perceived
obstacles to finding a workable and ecologically wise
governance mechanism to advance regulatory proposals.12
Studies of community-based resource management regimes
have suggested that relevant institutional innovations may
in fact occur at multiple semi-autonomous scales, allowing
organizations of all levels to perceive, respond, and adapt to
ecological information." This "collaborative ecosystem
governance" model would explicitly recognize the need for
integrated and holistic management, and would "grapplef[
with questions of scale and complexity in ecosystem
management, emphasizing locally or regionally tailored
solutions within broader structures of coordination and
public accountability."14 Ecosystem governance theory
recognizes the temptation and fallacy of waiting for better
information before undertaking action and seeks to
transcend the issue by developing institutions that are open
and adaptive to new knowledge. As Karkkainen puts it,
"although we can never know enough at any given moment
to decide what is right or best, we also cannot afford to defer
decision-making until'all the information is in' for the simple
11. See generally Lee P. Breckenridge, Special Challenges of Transboundary
Coordination in Restoring Freshwater Ecosystems, 19 PAc. McGEORGE GLOBAL
Bus. & DEV. L.J. 13 (2006).
12. Id. at 13-14.
13. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25
ENvTL. L. 973, 1088-92 (1995) (recommending multiple scales of organization and
both regional and local initiative); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative
Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189,
226-33 (emphasizing the importance of collaboration and cooperative solutions
across multiple scales).
14. Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 193.
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and inescapable reason that all the information will never be
in."15
A NOTE ON COLLECTIVE ACTION THEORY
Collective action theory is most famously developed in
Mancur Olson's influential work, The Logic of Collective
Action.'6 It predicts that when a common good is involved,
members of the group benefitting from the good have an
incentive to free ride in the hope of benefitting from the good
without bearing the costs. When taken in the aggregate these
individual behaviors mean that it is unlikely that the group
will organize itself to share the cost of the good. The good will
therefore not be provided unless one member is willing to
provide the good to the others. "Common" or "collective" goods
are available to every individual jointly, such that the
consumption by one individual does not decrease others'
ability to consume it, and no individual can be excluded from
consumption. 7 Global climate security is an archetypical
common good, and commentators have applied collective
action theory to climate change.'" For purposes of the
narrower topic of this Article a critical objective is to explain
why the collective action problem can be expected to be even
harder to overcome with respect to extreme climate events
management. Here the more limited literature on the
conditions that might allow regulatory success in the face of
15. Id. at 203; see also George Frampton, Ecosystem Management in the
Clinton Administration, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 44 (1996) ("[T]here is
never enough information to feel confident about a particular decision. No key
ecosystem management decision ever gets made in a setting of adequate
information.").
16. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1971); see also
Richard E. Levy, The Tie That Binds: Some Thoughts About the Rule of Law, Law
and Economics, Collective Action Theory, Reciprocity, and Heisenberg's
Uncertainty Principle, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 901, 906 (2008).
17. See generally OLSON, supra note 16.
18. See Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of
Regime Failure, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J., 195, 195 (2007); see also Simon Caney,
Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change, 18 LEIDEN J.
OF INT'L. L. 747, 747-48, 758 (2005).
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a potential collective action problem will provide a useful
starting point.'9
Part I presents the difficult dialectic between uncertainty
in climate change science and the ability of policy-makers to
coordinate on a global scale. For this, we identify a series of
scientific "moments" that lead to different approaches in
climate change policy-making. This is relevant when
responding to extreme weather events because the dynamic
between scientific uncertainty at various scales and policy-
making is even more exacerbated in that field than it is with
respect to climate change generally. Part II attempts to
theorize how policy-makers can transcend the collective
action dilemma to respond more effectively to the challenges
of extreme weather events. It proposes concrete regulatory
and policy instruments that could overcome collective action
roadblocks and present a matrix, which illustrates the
lessons learned in past policy to better predict the success of
future policies.
I. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND
POLICY-MAKING IN RESPONSE TO EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS:
A DIFFICULT DIALECTIC
Historically, we can identify three moments in the
relationship between science, uncertainty, and regulation in
the climate change field. Each encapsulates a different model
for addressing regulation in the face of uncertainty and each
therefore holds different lessons for the issue of managing
extreme weather events. This Part analyzes each of those
moments and examines what they might imply for policy-
makers' ability to tackle the challenges of extreme weather
events in the face of scientific uncertainty.
A. First Moment: No Harm, No Regulation
The Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius was the first to
suggest in 1896 that fossil fuel combustion could lead to
global warming, and proposed a link between atmospheric
19. Harris, supra note 18, at 196-98.
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carbon dioxide and temperature.2 0 Climate science in the late
19th and early 20th centuries suffered from lack of adequate
observations and insufficient physical understanding.2 1 The
development of the first climate model by Manabe and
Wetherald in 196722 ushered in a new era. However, the
implications of chaos theory, through pioneering work by Ed
Lorenz in the 1970s,2 3 made scientists wonder about the
intrinsic predictability of weather and climate systems.
Nonetheless, despite large uncertainties and notable
disagreements, the scientific community was beginning to
seriously consider and debate the possibility of human-
induced warming.2 4
These limitations of the scientific understanding shaped
the regulatory response. Traditionally, international law has
held that states are free to pursue activities that are not
prohibited and that do not infringe upon other states'
sovereignty. 25 Transboundary harm therefore had to be
demonstrated before states would consider regulating or
banning it, or perhaps even holding other states accountable
for the damage.2 6 As more scientific certainty emerged
20. See generally Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the
Air upon the Temperature of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. SCI. 237 (1896),
available at http://www.globalwarmingart.com/images/1/18/Arrhenius.pdf.
21. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 4 (Thomas
F. Stocker et al., eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013) [hereinafter IPCC, Summary
for Policymakers], available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/
report/WG1AR5_SPMFINAL.pdf.
22. See generally Syukuro Manabe & Richard T. Wetherald, Thermal
Equilibrium of the Atmosphere with a Given Distribution of Relative Humidity,
24 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 241 (1967).
23. See generally Edward N. Lorenz, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, 20 J.
ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 130 (1963).
24. SPENCER WEART, General Circulation Models of Climate, in THE DISCOVERY
OF GLOBAL WARMING (2014), http://aip.org/history/climate/GCM.htm
(supplementing Weart's book of the same title).
25. See S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at
18-19 (Sept. 7); Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963 (Mar. 11,
1941).
26. See "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10; Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A.
1905.
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regarding the harmful effect of human activities on global
commons such as the environment, the high seas, and the
atmosphere, states undertook to regulate those products or
activities. For example, after chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
were identified as a major cause of ozone depletion, the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and
the Montreal Protocol instituted a phase-out, eventually
leading to the ban on production of the product and the
partial recovery of the ozone layer.27 The predominant
regulation was reactionary rather than precautionary. As
such, the uncertainties in the scientific understanding of
climate change would have undermined regulatory responses
to climate change.
The lessons for extreme weather event policy of this type
of relationship between regulation and scientific uncertainty
are limited. Since extreme weather events are not caused by
any singly identifiable activity,2 8 they are unlikely to be
regulated by this regulatory approach of ex-post harm
reduction. Attempts at regulating a downstream
transboundary harm without being able to reach its cause
have had limited success. The Convention to Combat
Desertification (UNCCD), for instance, acknowledges the
need to address increasing desertification in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and despite most countries of the region being parties
to the convention, its effect has been limited at best. 29 A more
positive attempt to regulate a harm with complex and diffuse
causes may be found in the Med Plan.3 0 The Med Plan
brought together littoral states and the European
27. See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 2,
opened for signature, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29; Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, art. 2, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,097, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293.
28. IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 21, at 18, 20, 23.
29. Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought andlor Desertification, Particularly in Africa 108-09, opened for
signature Oct. 14, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention to Combat
Desertification]; see also Christoph Kohlmeyer & RalfWyrwinski, The Convention
to Combat Desertification: Relevant or a Relict?, 14 RURAL 21, no. 1, 2007, at 26
(Jan. 2007), available at http://www.rural21.com/uploads/media/ELR-
Theoutlook fortheUNCCDO0107.pdf.
30. Harris, supra note 18, at 205.
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Community to protect the Mediterranean Sea's environment
from pollutants that were contaminating the water and
surrounding state shores.3' The moderate success of this plan
is thought to be attributed to an increase of 'governmental
learning,' a process whereby scientists and ecologists
informed domestic and foreign policy-makers about the
extent of the problem so as to elicit their interest in
protecting the Mediterranean. "32 Following such
involvement, governments were able to overcome the
domination of stronger states and recalculate their interests
in light of the "professional campaign [led by ecologists and
marine scientists] to spread information."
B. Second Moment: "If You Break It, You Buy It"
As technology advanced, so did our understanding of the
climate system and the capabilities of scientific models of
climate. From the late 1970s through the 1990s, two major
developments transformed the field. First, the use of remote
sensors, such as radar and satellite measurements, morphed
climate and earth sciences from data poor to data rich
disciplines. Second, with improved physical understanding
and rapid advances in computing power, scientists were able
to develop large-scale global models that improved
projections on climate change. Consensus in the scientific
community started to form about anthropogenic warming by
the late 1980s, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) was established in 1988.34 Although the
understanding of atmospheric physics and chemistry
improved greatly during this time, deep uncertainties
continued to remain. In particular, debates remained about
the nature and cause of warming temperatures around the
world, with larger uncertainties in the characterization and
attribution of extreme weather or hydrological events. The
first, second, and third assessment reports of the IPCC were
31. Id.
32. Id. at 206.
33. Id.
34. History, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.
ipcc.chlorganization/organization-history.shtml (last visited May 19, 2014).
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published in 1990, 1995, and 2001, respectively, and
gradually provided more credence to the possibility of
anthropogenic warming.3 5 While the human activity
contribution to climate change is now well established, the
statements continued to be caveated with various measures
of uncertainties.3 6
This decrease in uncertainty in our understanding of
atmospheric physics and chemistry opened up the possibility
of global treaties. As the success of the Montreal Protocol
demonstrates, the ability of atmospheric scientists to firmly
establish the scientific validity of their claims and influence
policy was becoming clear.3 7 As Harris notes, "[a]ccording to
Benedick's account, 'Close collaboration between scientists
and key government officials who became convinced of the
long-term dangers ultimately prevailed over more parochial
and short-run interests of national politicians."'38 Discussing
the success of the Montreal Protocol, Harris wrote that "[i]t
was partly due to the influence of scientists that political
leaders took action on ozone despite there still being
considerable uncertainty about the full nature of the
problem."39 The atmospheric scientists were eventually
awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for their
contributions. 4 0  However, despite this progress in
atmospheric chemistry and their impacts on global treaties
of immense societal importance, debates continued to linger
in areas such as climate science.
The policy response in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the
rather gradual shift from the debate on whether climate
change was happening to how it was unfolding. The fourth
35. For an electronic version of the IPCC Assessment Reports, see Reports,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications anddata/publications anddata reports.shtml#1.
36. See generally IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 21.
37. Harris, supra note 18, at 208.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (Oct. 11, 1995),
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/chemistryllaureates/1995/
press.html.
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assessment report (AR4) of the IPCC in 2007 was the first to
conclude, based on the available scientific literature, that (a)
global warming was indeed happening, and (b)
anthropogenic emissions were the most likely cause. 4 1 The
anticipated impact of such a major declaration was expected
to be large, not just on climate science, but also on
international treaties and national policy. The IPCC was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for this effort. 42 However, the
impact in practice has fallen short.
With human contributions identified as a cause, the
regulatory response was to allocate responsibility based on
what each state had historically contributed to emissions and
other climate-changing activities. This focus on past
contributions led to the development of principles such as
"polluter-pays" and "common but differentiated
responsibilit[ies] ."43 Further scientific advancements on the
understanding of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions'
contribution to climate change allowed policy-makers to use
not only current emissions, but also predictions of future
emissions to apportion the burden among the states. Policies
of the 1990s and early 2000s reflected these advancements
by introducing carbon-trading ideas." In this regulatory
41. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 30, 37 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdflassessment-
reportlar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
42. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Committee (Oct. 27, 2007), available
at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peacellaureates/2007/press.html.
43. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principles 7, 15,
adopted June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 877, 879.
44. Aside from the Kyoto Protocol carbon trading scheme, a number of entities
have developed carbon trading schemes, including Australia, New Zealand, the
EU, Tokyo, and several U.S. states (including the New York state Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Chicago Climate Exchange, and five U.S. states
in conjunction with four Canadian provinces through the Western Climate
Initiative). See Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act
2008 (N.Z.); About the WCI, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/organization (last visited May 19, 2014);
Chicago Climate Exchange, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, https://www.theice.
com/ccx.jhtml (last visited May 19, 2014); Emissions Trading System, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eulclima/policies/ets/index-en.htm (last updated
May 14, 2014); Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme, INDEPENDENT PRICING AND
REGULATORY TRIBUNAL, http://www.ipart.nsw.gov.aulHome/Industries/
Electricity/GreenhouseGasReductionScheme (last visited May 19, 2014); The
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model, the difficulty is to allocate shares and to enforce the
commitments framework on reluctant actors who have
already enjoyed the benefit of their contribution to the
common harm and are less eager to bear the cost. The
incentive to free-ride is extremely high, both for historic
contributors and for prospective contributors. As has been
amply demonstrated by the experience of the Kyoto
Protocol,4 5 the collective action problem is acute. Preliminary
reports about the upcoming report from the UN Panel on
Climate Change (i.e., the Fifth Assessment Report or AR5)
and the recent literature suggest that only limited
improvements can be expected from the current generation
of models, such that the scientific uncertainty regarding
global climate modeling is unlikely to dramatically decrease
in the near future.4 6
The benefit of this model is that scientific uncertainty
regarding the location of the harm is irrelevant to legal
commitments. The regulatory framework is solely concerned
with who is responsible for past harm, who is a current
contributor, and who will be a future contributor. The
UNFCCC reflects this approach to some extent. It recognizes
that states have contributed diversely to the harm and calls
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, N.Y. DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/rggi.html (last visited May 19, 2014); Tokyo Kicks
Off Carbon Trading Scheme, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2010), http://
www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/08/tokyo-carbon-trading-scheme.
45. The status of ratifications shows that some emissions contributors listed in
Annex I of the UNFCCC are not are not parties to the Protocol, which would have
resulted in binding emission targets for these countries. Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, Dec. 10, 1997,
U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto
Protocol]. For a list of Annex I countries, see United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Annex I, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc No. 102-38,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
46. See generally Reto Knutti & Jan Sedlacek, Robustness and Uncertainties
in the New CMIP5 Climate Model Projections, NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE, 1 (2012),
available at http://www.iac.ethz.ch/people/knuttir/papers/knuttil2natcc.pdf;
Mark Maslin & Patrick Austin, Uncertainty: Climate Models At Their Limit?, 486
NATURE 183 (2012), available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v486/
n7402/full/486183a.html; see also IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, supra note
21, at 15.
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for commitments on that basis.47 The Kyoto Protocol's 1990
baselines and its tiered commitment system is further
embodiment of this model. Historic contributors to GHG
emissions have binding reduction targets (the Annex I
countries) and the debate raged over whether China, a fast
growing but recent contributor, should also have been
included in that group.4 8
This regulatory model holds valuable lessons in the
extreme weather event context. Since it is concerned with
apportioning obligations in relation to the contribution to the
root cause of the harm, scientific uncertainty regarding
where extreme weather might occur is largely irrelevant to
policy-making. The only pertinent issue is whether GHG
emissions are the cause of increased extreme weather events:
if science can give a reasonable level of certainty that the
causal relationship exists, then apportioning principles could
form the basis for regulation.
The SREX Report provides a bifurcated answer to this
question. On one hand, it establishes with a fairly high
degree of certainty a causal relationship between
anthropogenic climate change and an increase in the
frequency, duration, and severity of heat waves and
precipitations.4 9 On the other hand, it provides less clarity
with respect to a possible link between increased floods,
hurricanes, and droughts, and anthropogenic climate
change. 0 Uncertainty is likely to reduce with respect to
47. UNFCCC, supra note 45, art. 3(1) ("The Parties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country
Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects
thereof."); id. art. (4)(2)(a) (". . . and taking into account the differences in these
Parties' starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases,
the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available
technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the need for equitable
and appropriate contributions by each of these Parties to the global effort
regarding that objective.").
48. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 45. For a list of Annex I countries, see UNFCCC,
supra note 45.
49. SREX Report, supra note 1, at 119.
50. Id.
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causation dynamics for precipitation extremes, but less
progress is expected in the understanding of the relationship
between climate change and increased hurricanes and
floods.'
Establishing the link between anthropogenic climate
change and extreme weather events is an issue of attribution.
As climate change is by nature a statistical phenomenon,
scientists cannot assert that any particular event is directly
attributable to global warming, but scientists have proven
that climate change has had a significant impact on extreme
weather events.52 Jerry Meehl of the National Center for
Atmospheric Research (NCAR) analogizes the use of steroids
in baseball5 3 : a baseball player has a certain average level of
home run production in his baseball career before he
allegedly starts taking steroids. After that, his home run
production increases, and he sets the single season record for
home runs. While we cannot say that any particular home
run was enabled by the use of performance enhancers, we
know that the odds of hitting a home run have increased.5 4
Climate change has caused a similar shift in relation to
the occurrence of extreme weather events. "A changing
climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial
extent, duration, and timing of weather and climate
extremes, and can result in unprecedented extremes."5
Because the probability of changes in climate extremes has
generally increased due to climate change, it may be possible
to attribute the occurrence of a specific extreme weather
51. Usually, this is a combination of the unknowns in physics, inability of
models to capture even that physics that is known, and intrinsic system
uncertainties. Some of these issues are caused by long-standing gaps in the
science and models. Predictability (i.e., intrinsic variability issues) is more of an
issue for hurricanes and tornadoes and less for temperature extremes, with heavy
rain somewhere in between.
52. SREX Report, supra note 1, at 8-9, 127.
53. AtmosNews, Steroids, Baseball, and Climate Change, UNIV. CORP. FOR
ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH (Feb. 2012), https://www2.ucar.edulatmosnews/
attribution/steroids-baseball-climate-change.
54. Id.
55. SREX Report, supra note 1, at 115.
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event to the changed probability of its occurrence. 6 The
SREX Report notes that "climate models can sometimes be
used to identify if specific factors are changing the likelihood
of the occurrence of extreme events" as was the case for the
European heat wave in 2003.57 The SREX Report recalls that
"a model experiment indicated that human influences more
than doubled the likelihood of having a summer in Europe as
hot as that of 2003."58
This scientific uncertainty regarding contribution to
climate change and extreme weather events may undermine
a regulatory policy model where obligations are apportioned
to causation. The implications are far-reaching. While
causation and apportioning between levels of emissions and
increased extreme weather events is fairly well established,
a breakdown by classes of weather events would be more
difficult to define. Mitigation and remediation policies, if
passed on an apportioning model between responsibility for
climate change emissions and resulting damages, would have
to be devised on an aggregate basis, lumping together all
damages from extreme weather events. However, the
vulnerability to extreme events varies by communities. Even
if it is established that the emitters bear a responsibility to
prevent, mitigate, and alleviate, what responsibility befalls
on the local community to also reduce its vulnerability? For
instance, an alluvial plain community that is more
vulnerable to floods due to climate change should receive,
under an apportionment model, some compensation for the
damages incurred, but does it also mean that such a
community should limit its exposure by not further
developing in that area?
This "moment" in regulatory history also saw a shift from
strictly reactionary policy-making to some level of
precautionary regulation.5 9 The argument is that the
precautionary principle justifies regulation in the absence of
56. Id. at 127.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Sonia Boutillon, Student Note, The Precautionary Principle: Development
of an International Standard, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429, 430-31 (2002).
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scientific certainty if there is a substantial risk of irreversible
harm.6 0 The main drawback for this regulatory model is that
it would only be effective at managing extreme weather
events at the global scale by eliminating their general cause:
climate change. In other words, assuming that climate
change is the main cause of increased extreme weather
events, this model will only work if it successfully prevents
or reverses climate change. There are increasing indications,
however, that prevention of climate change has failed and
that reversal is unlikely in the short to medium term.6 1
C. Third Moment: Think Global, Act Local?
Progress on the scientific understanding of climate
change was significant for a number of years and several
hypotheses about global warming, anthropogenic causes,
extreme weather events, and their impacts on natural
hazards and disasters, were examined and accepted with
various margins of uncertainty.6 2 However, towards the
latter part of the 1990s and into the new millennium,
questions arose regarding the gains achieved from successive
generation global climate models and the uncertainties these
gains yielded. Scientists know much more about climate
change, with a greater degree of certainty in some cases, but
also recognize that in many important situations, scientific
understanding is still limited and improvements on current
models are few and far between.6 3
With both the science and the policy-making at a
standstill at the global scale, the action has moved to the
regional and local scales. Climate change modeling now aims
to improve the resolution of global scale models, as well as
regional models and statistical methods, and address
discrepancies between global, regional, and local predictions.
In particular, scientists aimed to downscale the results at the
local level by using regional climate models andlor statistical
60. Id.
61. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995,
at 28 (1995), available at http://www.ipce.chipdf/climate-changes-1995/ipce-2nd-
assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf.
62. SREX Report, supra note 1, at 6.
63. IPCC, Summary for Policymakers, supra note 21, at 15-16.
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procedures. In pursuance of that goal, scientists have
established systematic procedures to further develop and
manage simulations from global and regional climate models.
Scientists are now observing and modeling a wider range of
earth system components and processes, such as land and
vegetation models, ocean models, and sea ice models, in an
effort to understand the contributions of these processes and
improve overall projections."
International policy from the late 2000s to date has
mirrored this refocus. In fact, the recently released Fifth
Assessment Report from the IPCC calls for immediate action
to head off the worst of the damage impacts of climate
change, noting that "adaptation and mitigation choices in the
near-term will affect the risks of climate change throughout
the 21st century."65 Regional organizations, such as APEC 66
and ASEAN,6 7 that were founded for other purposes are now
finding it within their mandate to consider the impact of
climate change on their members. This localization of focus
translates into policy decisions that increase local adaptation
and mitigation efforts. Unlike in the second "moment" where
64. See generally Kumar et al., Regional and Seasonal Intercomparison of
CMIP3 and CMIP5 Climate Model Ensembles for Temperature and Precipitation,
42 CLIMATE DYNAMICS (forthcoming 2014).
65. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY 10 (2014), http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/
IPCCWG2AR5SPMApproved.pdf.
66. APEC was established "to support sustainable economic growth and
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region." About APEC: Mission Statement, ASIA-
PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/
Mission-Statement.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2014). The organization's
Emergency Preparedness initiative aims "to better prepare for and respond to
emergencies and [weather-related] disasters by helping to reduce the risk of
disasters and building business and community resilience." Emergency
Preparedness, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, http://www.apec.org/Home/
Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperatiod
Working-Groups/Emergency-Preparedness.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
67. ASEAN has committed to encouraging its member states to support and
participate in the UNFCCC. ASEAN Leaders' Statement on Climate Change to
the 17th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 7th Session of the Conference
of Parties Serving as the Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, ASEAN (Nov.
17, 2011), http://environment.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ASEAN_
LeadersStatementonClimateChange.pdf.
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action (and hence cost) was apportioned to causation, the
burden of intervention seems to be displaced to the place
where the harm is, or will be, felt. In this type of governance
intervention, there may be a lower collective action problem,
because there are fewer actors to coordinate and they tend to
be a more homogenous constituency with a direct interest.
The move away from a single, global regulatory framework
also allows for diverse regulatory experimentation. However,
a drawback of local or regional-based regulatory models is
that they most likely mean that the costs will be left for the
local or regional groups to bear, regardless of who is
responsible for the harm.
The implications of this third regulatory model in the
extreme weather events context are also problematic. While
policy-makers might be better able and willing to act at the
local or regional scale, the scientific modeling capability is
much more limited and uncertain. This regulatory approach
requires a more accurate scientific understanding of the
localization of the harm, rather than the cause of the harm
in the previous moment. With respect to modeling of extreme
weather events, this is a major challenge.
Overall then, the three regulatory models for climate
change have all been fraught with failure, but most critically
for extreme weather events management, they can be read
as a roadmap of the policy challenges in this field. Reactive
regulation in the face of harm (first "moment") does not
facilitate prevention; apportionment of responsibility to
emissions (second "moment") requires a causation link
between emissions and extreme events and requires
participation of all major emitters; local adaptation and
mitigation (third "moment") burdens the affected local
communities and gives no leverage to stem the root cause of
climate change at the global level. The following Section
attempts to model the dilemmas of policy-making for extreme
climate events in the face of collective action and scientific
uncertainty at various geographic scales.
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D. Collective Action, Scientific Uncertainty, and Geographic
Scale: A Triangle of Impossibilities?
Schiermeier recently highlighted the scope and nature of
scientific uncertainty in the field.6 8 He argued that while
anthropogenic global warming may be scientifically well
established, "[t]he sad truth of climate science is that the
most crucial information is the least reliable."69 The gaps
highlighted in the article include our inability to project at
(high-resolution) scales relevant for decision-makers, lack of
understanding of precipitation processes, inadequate
understanding of the impacts of aerosols, and the lingering
controversies in reconstructions of historical millennial scale
climate change from proxy records.7 0 In 2012, the IPCC's
Special Report on Extremes (SREX) noted the high degree of
uncertainty with precise projections and locations of extreme
weather or hydrological events related to climate change.7 '
Growing heat waves and heavy precipitation events have
been statistically related to human-induced warming at
aggregate scales for a while. 72 Emerging literature has
highlighted the possibility of exacerbating droughts7 3 and an
increase in the more intense tropical cyclones7 4 with climate
change, despite remaining uncertainties.75 There have even
been occasional attempts to attribute specific regional and
seasonal extreme events to anthropogenic global warming;
however, such attempts continue to be fraught with
uncertainties.7 6
While promising in terms of decreased collective action
problems, local or regional regulatory intervention will have
68. Quirin Schiermeier, The Real Holes in Climate Science, 463 NATURE 284,
284 (2010).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 284-87.
71. SREX Report, supra note 1, at 130.
72. Id. at 141-43.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 130.
76. Id. at 127.
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to contend with dramatically more scientific uncertainty
regarding the location and extent of extreme weather events.
This is important in light of the fact that most regulatory
interventions include a cost-benefit analysis.7 7 It may be that
once uncertainty is factored in, the cost-benefit analysis of
intervention at the local scale will never support preventive
intervention. Put simply, a cost-benefit based regulatory
approach means that if there is no real understanding of the
probability that the next tsunami will hit a particular coastal
town, then it may not be worthwhile to erect sea defenses in
that locality, compared to the cost of rebuilding after the fact
in the place where the damage actually occurred.
Collective Action
Scientific Spatial Scale
Uncertainty
Figure 1. Extreme Weather Events Triangle of Impossibilities
To this day, it seems that most policy interventions have
failed or are likely to fail because of what we could term a
triangle of impossibilities specific to extreme weather events
(Figure 1). For a given geographic scale, scientific
uncertainty and collective action problems are in an inverse
relationship. At the scale where there is the most scientific
certainty, the collective action problem is at its peak, likely
defeating any attempt at effective international disciplines.
At the local scale where policies are more likely to be
implemented, scientific uncertainty regarding extreme
weather events is at its maximum, such that it will be
difficult for policy-makers to rely on scientific models (Table
77. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 12, 2011);
NICK HANLEY & CLIVE L. SPASH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 4-
7 (1993).
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1). This would suggest that any regulatory intervention that
is preventative or anticipatory would be doomed to fail, and
that policy-makers may at best only be able to engage in
remediation efforts. If that is true, the lessons for policy-
makers are that remediation is their best alternative to a
negotiated agreement. It may be, though, that another
generation of regulatory tools could help overcome the
triangle of impossibilities. Through a combination of
empirical examples and theoretical analysis, the next Part
offers some proposals for such regulatory devices.
Scientific
Spatial Uncertainty Collective
Scale for Regarding Action Extreme Weather Event
Policy Occurrence Problem for Policy-MakingPoli of Extreme Multi Actor Challenges
Weather Coordination
Events
- High degree of scientific
uncertainty regarding
events tends to hinder
policy intervention
Local Highest Lowest - Policy intervention at the
local level may have low
effectiveness (local
prevention and
remediation only)
- Increased number and
types of actors makes
Regional/ . coordination difficult
Continental High Variable/High - Regional climate
modeling remains highly
uncertain
- Cost of actor coordination
is high; inertia and free-
rider incentives makes
coordination extremely
difficult
Global Lowest Highest - Lowest level of scientific
uncertainty is helpful on
aggregate but aggregate
models make it difficult to
identify specific
meaningful interventions
Table 1. Relationship Between the Triangle of Impossibilities Variables and
Policy-Making for Extreme Weather Events
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II. OVERCOMING THE TRIANGLE OF IMPOSSIBILITIES
If the triangle of impossibilities identified in the first part
of this Article is truly an impediment to policy-making, then
we must explore what policies might be effective with only
two sides of the triangle. Policy interventions in recent
decades have taken several approaches to try to overcome the
international collective action problem that plagues global
climate change efforts. The success of these policies can be
analyzed with regard to how important scientific certainty is
to the type of policy developed and the scale at which the
policy is implemented. Interventions have failed even when
scientific uncertainty is irrelevant, partially due to a
collective action problem. By contrast, some interventions
that rely on a lot of "uncertain science" are successful when
developed and implemented at a smaller scale. A marriage of
the "right" amount of reliance on science aimed at the
appropriate level of spatial scale might allow policy-makers
to transcend the collective action dilemma and respond more
effectively to the challenge of extreme weather events.
This Part presents a number of policies, successful and
unsuccessful, their implementation on a global or local scale,
and their reliance on scientific principles developed in the
field of climate change. Section A examines the successes and
shortcomings of multi-scale intervention in the face of
scientific uncertainty. Section B assesses the potential of low
collective action interventions at the local scale. Section C
identifies how the issue of scale could be overcome, despite
increased collective action problems.
A. Overcoming Collective Action Problems: Multi-Scale
Intervention in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty
In this Section, we focus on policies that might be
implemented at the local and global scale, taking into account
the relative scientific uncertainty at the global and local
scales. The objective is to overcome the issue arising from the
third side of the triangle, the collective action problem, which
is more acute at the more global scale. Such a scenario is
illustrated by the Kyoto Protocol, which will be remembered
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for failing to meet its emissions targets.78 Even though the
agreement was signed by many countries, the United States,
China, and India-three of the largest GHG emitters-did
not ratify the Protocol or make emissions commitments
under it. 79 As a result, global emissions have continued to
rise, eventually crossing the "historic threshold" of 400 ppm
CO 2 and entering into a "new danger zone." 0 Failure to bind
these important countries is a prime example of the collective
action problem at the global scale and its effect on climate
change and extreme weather events.' The failure of global
efforts to curb emissions has two sets of implications for
extreme weather events. First, it means that climate change
will continue to progress and with it the increased frequency
and magnitude of extreme events.8 2 Regulatory interventions
would therefore be displaced from a general attempt at
managing climate change to a more focused effort to manage
the impacts of extreme weather events. Second, it means that
the regulatory model of global apportioned commitments is
not effective and that coordinated efforts to tackle the cost
and damages resulting from extreme events should be
framed differently.8 3 Each issue is addressed in more detail
in this Section.
1. Decoupling Extreme Weather Events Management
from Climate Change Regulation
While the discourse of climate change remains somewhat
of a political lightning rod, the localized and more
immediately visible impact of extreme weather events may
make it politically more likely to seek an effective response.
78. Gwyn Prins & Steve Rayner, The Kyoto Protocol, 64 BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS 45, 45 (2008).
79. Id. at 47-48.
80. Christiana Figueres, Exec. Sec'y, Statement by UNFCCC Executive
Secretary on Crossing of 400 ppm C02 Threshold (May 31, 2013), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news-room/press releases and-advisories/applicatio
n/pdf/400_ppm mediaalert_13052013.pdf.
81. Prins & Rayner, supra note 78, at 46.
82. See id. at 45-46.
83. See id.
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The fact that modeling of extreme weather events at the local
scale is still quite imprecise does not seem to have gained
much traction in the face of uncontestable damage from
events such as hurricanes and floods. In other words, the
political and psychological importance of scientific
uncertainty with respect to climate change more generally
seems to recede in the face of actual local extreme weather
events. Indeed, a recent study published in Nature Climate
Change found that "individuals who have direct experience
of phenomena that may be linked to climate change [are]
more likely to be concerned by the issue."8 4
Resiliency (with respect to floods, droughts, energy, etc.)
has been adopted as a call word across the political spectrum
and has been readily embraced by policy-makers." In the
United States, efforts to adapt to what officials are calling a
"new normal" climate took center stage in a 2012 U.S. Senate
hearing on climate change, which was the first of its type in
two and a half years.8 6 Journalists have noted that extreme
weather has the potential to renew a conversation on climate
change and gain political traction because of the necessity to
create policies around it, which may include changing
84. Alexa Spence et al., Perceptions of Climate Change and Willingness to Save
Energy Related to Flood Experience, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 46, 46 (2011),
available at http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v1/n1/full/nclimate
1059.html.
85. See Extreme Weather Events: The Cost of Not Being Prepared: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff., 113th Cong. (2014)
(joint statement David Heyman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, Dep't of
Homeland Sec. & Caitlin Durkovich, Assistant Secretary, Office of Infrastructure
Prot., Nat'l Prot. & Programs Directorate, Dep't of Homeland Sec.); Press Release,
White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Exec. Order - Preparing the U.S. for the
Impacts of Climate Change (Nov. 1, 2013) (on file with author); Amy Harder &
Coral Davenport, Climate-Change Debate Aside, Sandy Inspires 'Resiliency
Planning' for Extreme Weather, NAT'L J. (Oct 31. 2012),
http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy/climate-change-debate-aside-sandy-
inspires-resiliency-planning-for-extreme-weather-20121031.
86. Update on the Latest Climate Change Science and Local Adaptation
Measures Before S. Comm. On Env't & Pub. Works, 112th Cong. (2012), available
at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&
Hearing ID=cO293eca-802a-23ad-4706-02abdbf7f7c3.
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building codes in flood plains and on shorelines, constructing
offshore wind turbines, and managing suburban sprawl.8 7
And it has. In 2012, the devastation from a succession of
extreme events and breaking climate records gave U.S.
policy-makers and the public pause, generating a fresh
interest in not only addressing climate change, but also in
adopting critical resilience and adaptability measures at the
state and national level." Although Democrats and
Republicans in Congress may not always agree on GHG
emissions, they do share a concern about the need for climate
change adaptation at the local level, evidenced by a Senate
resolution introduced in January that calls for lawmakers to
"prepare and protect communities" from extreme weather.8 9
A recent editorial written by former EPA leaders illustrates
this point. Ruckelshaus, Thomas, Reilly, and Todd, all
administrators of the EPA under Republican presidents,
wrote that the United States must transcend political
affiliation and take substantial steps to curb climate change
and "start the overdue debate about what bigger steps are
needed and how to achieve them-domestically and
internationally."90
Decoupling the politics of extreme weather events from
those of climate change also allows the discourse on extreme
weather events to be somewhat freer from the politicized
uncertainties and public misunderstandings relating to the
science of climate change. This may provide support for a
broader based climate change policy intervention that is
initially positioned in relation to extreme weather events. In
other words, even though the science indicates that
anthropogenic climate change is a causal factor in the
87. Scott Dance, Severe Weather Renews Climate-Change Talks in Washington,
Annapolis, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 2, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/
2012-08-02/news/bs-md-climate-change-20120801_1_climate-change-climate-
change-talks-severe-weather.
88. Sarah Kellogg, The Cost of Doing Nothing, 27 WASH. LAw. (May 2013),
http://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/
may-2013-hurrican-cost.cfm.
89. Id.
90. William D. Ruckelshaus et al., Op-Ed, A Republican Case for Climate
Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, at A21.
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increase in extreme weather events (which can be viewed as
a top down relationship), it may be easier to build policies
around a bottom-up approach that starts with a focus on
extreme events and grows to involve broader climate-change
and emissions reduction interventions. For instance, the
recent study in Nature Climate Change linked flooding
experience to lower levels of uncertainty regarding climate
change.91 As some commentators note, "[d]isasters often
highlight the need for a well-functioning, well-funded
government, and extreme weather events help make the case
that rising global temperatures really do have catastrophic
effects on all of us."92 This catastrophic effect may create the
political pressure needed to force policy-makers to address
the effects of extreme weather and eventually the
anthropogenic causes of climate change.
Another important consideration is financial resources.
While state and local budgets may not offer much for curbing
climate change, where costs and benefits are diffuse,
resiliency of specific communities and infrastructure may be
a much more tangible objective. Such is the goal of the Asian
Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (ACCCRN), an
organization funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, which
experiments with a range of activities that will collectively
improve the ability of the ten participating cities to
withstand, to prepare for, and to recover from the projected
impacts of climate change.93 Similar to ACCCRN, the
Institute for Social and Environmental Transition-
International (ISET) "has worked with stakeholders in
[fifteen] cities in [five] countries . .. to identify the challenges
climate change will pose for these cities and to begin the
process of systematically building city resilience to climate
change in the face of those challenges."94 ISET's process
91. Spence et al., supra note 84, at 47-48.
92. Ben Cohen, Dear Liberals, Please Don't Politicize the Oklahoma Tornado,
THE DAILY BANTER (May 21, 2013), http://thedailybanter.com/2013/05/dear-
liberals-please-dont-politicize-the-oklahoma-tornado.
93. Participating Countries, ASIAN CITIES CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE
NETWORK, http://www.acccrn.org/about-acccrn/participating-countries (last
visited Apr. 27, 2014).
94. Karen MacClune & Sarah Optiz-Stapleton, Building Urban Resilience to
Climate Change: What Works Where, and Why, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND
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includes the development and refining of a "resilience-
building curriculum that includes laying the groundwork for
addressing climate change and climate resilience, conducting
a climate change vulnerability and risk assessment, and
using this assessment and other materials to prepare an
initial resilience strategy."9 5
The costs of rebuilding public and private infrastructure
after a tornado or flood are much easier to assess than the
creeping damage of desertification. Crops destroyed by
drought and spikes in food prices due to the ensuing
shortages are also readily ascertainable. Hence, inasmuch as
environmental policies world-wide remain based on
traditional short- and medium-term cost-benefit analysis,
focusing on extreme weather events as an entry point for
climate change policy-making may give policy-makers more
political traction than tackling the broader problem of
climate change directly.
While some of the scale and uncertainty problems of
climate change might be lesser impediments to responding to
extreme weather events disasters, the issue remains that
scientific models are not likely to give reliable predictions
regarding the location of disasters. 96 As such, it puts policy-
makers largely in an ex-post responsiveness mode, rather
than in a preventive mode. Because the risk and scope of
future damages are difficult to assess, making a cost-benefit
analysis may be impossible. Therefore, it may be that there
is still a need for a national or supranational regulatory
process to assist particular communities with the cost and
response to extreme weather events. The following Section
explores the possibility of coordination in the extreme
weather events space.
2. Global Policy Coordination: A Doomed Enterprise?
While some countries may be adequately equipped to
respond to extreme weather events, a number of developing
countries, in particular, are much more vulnerable. While
ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITION (2012), http://www.i-s-e-t.org/images/pdfs/iset
buildingurbanresiliencetoclimatechangel120831.pdf.
95. Id.
96. SREX Report, supra note 1, at 19, 47-48.
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Hurricanes Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2012, in the Gulf
Coast and the East Coast of the United States, respectively,
did not require international intervention, the extreme
flooding in Thailand in 2011, extreme tropical storms in the
Caribbean, heavy monsoon rains in 2010 in Pakistan, and the
2008 cyclone that devastated Burma/Myanmar have called
for international support to assist in the immediate response
as well as in the longer term rebuilding efforts. For instance,
United Nations and U.S. agencies provided about $335
million for emergency response and recovery activities after
Cyclone Nargis in Burma/Myanmar.9 7 Another example of
international funding efforts is the $100 million that
Congress allocated to the Caribbean countries Grenada,
Jamaica, and Haiti after September 2004 Hurricane Ivan
and Tropical Storm Jeanne.9 8 Recently, the United Nations
Climate Conference set up a new international mechanism to
help developing countries affected by loss and damage from
climate change impacts, such as the Philippines typhoon. 99
The mechanism is "tasked to provide countries with technical
support, to facilitate actions and improve coordination of
work inside the UN Climate Convention as well as with other
organizations" while also "mobalis[ing] and secur[ing] funds,
technology and capacity building activities."100
For many countries, then, the increased incidence and
gravity of extreme weather events related to global climate
change cannot be addressed purely locally or even nationally.
If the theory of common but differentiated responsibility is to
have a bearing on mitigation and adaptation efforts, then
states will need to devise international cooperation
mechanisms to remedy the harm borne by smaller developing
97. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-700, BURMA: UN AND U.S.
AGENCIES ASSISTED CYCLONE VICTIMS IN DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENT, BUT IMPROVED
U.S. MONITORING NEEDED (2011).
98. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-645, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE:
USAID COMPLETED MANY CARIBBEAN DISASTER RECOVERY ACTIVITIES, BUT
SEVERAL CHALLENGES HAMPERED EFFORTS (2006).
99. Martin Kohr, Outcome of UN Climate Conference in Warsaw (COPl9),
SOUTHNEWS (Nov. 26, 2013), http://us5.campaign-archive2.com/
?u=fa9cf38799136b5660f367ba6&id=8caa8f6c&e=[UNIQID].
100. Id.
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states that contributed the least to climate change but are
also the least able to cope with its consequences. The plight
of Pacific island states that are likely to become inhabitable
in less than fifty years due to the rise of sea levels has been
well publicized, though no solution has emerged yet
regarding the potential relocation of their population and
future of their statehood. 0 Short of that, it is likely that
these particularly vulnerable states would be jeopardized by
severe weather events even before the rise in sea levels
becomes the primary issue.102
International coordination is necessary for two
important reasons. The first is financial. In order to fund the
roughly $5 trillion investment that the International Energy
Agency reports will be necessary to achieve climate goals by
2020, it is necessary that the international community work
together to finance this investment. 03 Although some
financing comes by way of official development assistance
and private investment, these funds are voluntary and fall
short of the needs.104 The second reason is the peace and
security issues that may arise when the threats of climate
change become a reality. These possibilities were illustrated
in a simulation "war game" orchestrated by the Center for a
New American Security, which was intended to explore the
national security consequences of climate change and the
likely challenges the world faces, such as mass migration, an
increased incidence of intense storms, high risk of conflict,
and low capacity for cross-border cooperation. 10
101. Julia Pyper & ClimateWire, Storm Surges, Rising Seas Could Doom Pacific
Islands This Century, ScI. AM. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.
com/article/storm-surges-rising-seas-could-doom-pacific-islands-this-century.
102. Id.
103. Alex Morales, Climate Goals Require $5 Trillion Investment by 2020,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-25/climate-
goals-require-5-trillion-investment-by-2020.html.
104. The Global Climate Change Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (June
19, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-climate-change-regimel
p21831.
105. Sharon Burke & Christine Parthemore, Climate Change War Game: Major
Findings and Background (Ctr. For a New Am. Sec. Working Paper, 2009),
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The issue then is whether any sort of international
coordination is a realistic prospect in the face of the failure of
the Kyoto Protocol (discussed above) and other schemes such
as the Convention to Combat Desertification.106 More positive
examples such as the Montreal Protocol may provide some
cause for optimism.107 Would an international attempt to
coordinate with respect to extreme weather events be more
like the former or the latter?
Despite its wide ratification (195 state parties), the 1994
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) involved
mostly aspirational and hortatory provisions, calling for
cooperation and technology transfer from industrialized
countries much as a framework convention would do.10 The
ten-year strategy for implementation of the UNCCD involved
scientific collaboration around agreed themes and support to
impact the monitoring and reporting under the UNCCD
system, active influencing of relevant international, national,
and local processes and actors, identifying and taking action
on interlinkages of selected key themes, joint activities by the
secretariats of three "sister Conventions," and online tools
and information on capacity building. 109 Although the
UNCCD specifically targets the three known factors causing
a lack of progress in addressing desertification (inadequate
focus on indirect drivers, inadequate funding, and an absence
of effective domestic policies), and the international
normative infrastructure is very much in place, "the words
belie the lack of action."'10 As Tal observes, "[d]espite the
intentions and rhetoric [of going beyond direct physical
causes and confronting the indirect drivers of
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Climate-WarGame-Working
%20Paper_0.pdf.
106. See Prins & Rayner, supra note 78, at 45; Alon Tal, Degraded
Commitments: Reviving International Efforts to Combat Desertification, 13
BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 187, 189 (2007) and accompanying footnotes.
107. Harris, supra note 18, at 204-05 and accompanying footnotes.
108. Convention to Combat Desertification, supra note 29, arts. 9-21.
109. Key Topics, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION,
(last visited Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.unccd.int/en/programmes/Pages/
home.aspx.
110. Tal, supra note 106, at 189.
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desertification], in practice the UNCCD has done little if
anything to direct the attention of its member nations to
interventions that might address deeper sociological
factors."'
On the other hand, the Montreal Protocol has been
effective at reducing and reversing the ozone layer
depletion."l2 In this instance, scientists were able to forecast
that ozone depletion could be reversed and reduced, with the
stratospheric ozone layer expected to recover over the next
fifty years or so."' Harris notes that the Montreal Protocol
was successful in part because it contains requisites for
collective action discussed by Olson, especially selective
incentives or side-payments, and also because it incorporated
Olson's theory of small group committees.114 Benedick and
Haas give much credit to scientists who were active in
workshops, conferences, and consultations that laid the
foundation for the eventual international consensus.' '1 In
particular, Benedick believed it was thanks to this "[c]lose
collaboration between scientists and key government officials
who became convinced of the long-term dangers," despite
there still being considerable uncertainty about the full
nature of the problem, that a coordinated response
"ultimately prevailed over more parochial and short-run
interests of national politicians."116
One possibility for international cooperation would be to
create a global insurance fund to help compensate for the
damage resulting from extreme weather events and engage
in preparation and prevention policies. The insurance
mechanism could also include a knowledge repository
function, to collect best practices and other information
relating to the impact and adequacy of various policies. In
111. Id.
112. Harris, supra note 18, at 204-05.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 205, 209.
115. See id. at 208.
116. Richard E. Benedick, Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in
Diplomacy, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 112, 144 (Jessica Tuchman
Mathews ed., 1991).
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deploying the insurance funds, the organization could
include an advisory function to assist states in choosing
policy responses that are most appropriate. The advantage of
such a system is that it is not contingent on reducing the
scientific uncertainty regarding the location or risk of
incidence of a particular adverse event and could rely instead
on the available global data on extreme events projections to
determine how much the fund should be capitalized. In
practice, private insurers and some NGOs are already
working to incorporate risks related to climate change in
insurance strategies.'1 7
The idea of an insurance fund is inspired by Rawls'
theory of social justice, where actors make decisions under a
veil of ignorance because they do not know what their lot will
be and therefore they all attempt to minimize the worst lot,
as they might be the recipients of it."' The analogy is limited
by the fact that policy-makers in fact do have some
knowledge about their state's vulnerability to extreme
weather events, but they cannot be sure of their ability to
cope with future harm. Even in the United States, a more
vulnerable state like Louisiana was not able to address the
damage from an extreme event such as Hurricane Katrina
and cannot be sure that federal resources will be available in
the future to support it. As such, the veil of ignorance still
largely stands.
Mechanisms for funding such an insurance fund could be
drawn from other successful instruments. Funding
contributions could be proportionate to historic emissions
(common but differentiated responsibility principle) and
current emissions (polluter-pays principle) such as the Gas
Guzzler Tax'19 or Superfund Law'2 0 in the United States.
Another funding allocation may be apportionment to a
country's economic size, as used by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development and the
117. See, e.g., CLIMATEWISE, http://www.climatewise.org.uk (last visited Apr.
27, 2014).
118. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-40 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
119. Gas Guzzler Tax, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4064 (2005).
120. Hazardous Substance Superfund, 26 U.S.C.A. § 9507 (1986).
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International Monetary Fund.12 ' These organizations act like
credit unions and fund their budgets by collecting resources
from their member countries in quota subscriptions, or
membership fees.122 Funding could also be drawn in the
manner of investments and lending, such as the World Bank,
which offers its member nations equity shares in the Bank.'23
Finally, a financial mechanism such as the GEF Trust Fund,
which seeks voluntarily committed funds, may be employed
to serve as the controller of donations collected from donor
countries, international organizations, civil society
organizations, and the private sector. 124 Replenishment of the
Trust Fund takes place every four years based on donor
pledges that are funded over a four-year period.12 5
B. Overcoming Scientific Uncertainty: Low Collective
Action Interventions at the Local Scale
In this Section, we focus on policies that might be
implemented at the local or regional scale, but that have an
impact at a more global scale. Collective action is less of an
issue since the intervention is more local, so both the scale
and collective action sides of the triangle are satisfied. The
objective is to overcome the issue arising from the third side
of the triangle, the scientific uncertainty, which is most
prevalent at the local scale.
Many theorists agree that knowledge is an important
part of cooperation. 2 6 The collective action theory goes as far
121. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. III, Dec.
27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401 (current version at 15 I.L.M. 546, 547 (Apr. 30, 1976)).
122. David Driscoll, The IMF and the World Bank: How Do They Differ?, INT'L
MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm (last
updated Aug. 1996); see also Budget, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/budget (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
123. Driscoll, supra note 122.
124. GEF-Administered Trust Funds, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY,
http://www.thegef.org/gef/trust funds (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
125. Id.
126. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 182 (1982); Harris, supra note
18, at 204; see generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECoNOMY (1984); OLSON, supra note 16.
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as suggesting that information is essential to increase the
likelihood of effective international collective action. 12 7
According to Hardin, "[t]he degree of cooperation may depend
on the quality of knowledge generally available."1 28
Information proved to be a critical factor in the creation of
the Med Plan cleanup and the Montreal Protocol ozone-
protection regime, and it is proving to be even more critical
for climate change. 129 The issue with extreme climate events
is the vast scientific uncertainty at the more local scales, the
fact that such uncertainty may be intractable barring some
unforeseeable major physics breakthrough, and the
epistemic difficulty in apportioning the role of climate change
to particular extreme weather events.
1. Lessons from Domestic Regulation: Successes in
Ecosystem Management
Ecosystem management, proposed as the modern and
preferred way of managing natural resources in the United
States, is "driven by explicit goals, executed by policies,
protocols, and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring
and research based on [the] best understanding of the
ecological interactions and processes necessary to sustain
ecosystem composition, structure, and function."'3 0
The conventional strategy of ecosystem management is
to act when there is reasonable certainty of what the effects
will be, and then adopt rules based on the current
understanding.1 3 ' This approach often focuses on maximizing
short-term yield and economic gain, while trying to overcome
obstacles including inadequate information, the openness
and interconnectedness of ecosystems on scales that
transcend management boundaries, widespread ignorance of
the function and dynamics of ecosystems, and the prevailing
127. See Harris, supra note 18, at 223.
128. Id. at 204 (quoting HARDIN, supra note 126, at 182).
129. Id.
130. Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the Ecological Society of
America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 665 (1996).
131. Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 201.
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public perception that immediate economic and social value
outweigh the risk of future ecosystem damage. 13 2 Many
scholars believe that this strategy "is a prescription for
inaction and ineffectiveness, or policy failure.""3
By contrast, some scholars are recognizing the need for
an integrated, holistic management of ecosystems, which
takes into account questions of scale and involves
"continuous experimentation and dynamic adjustment in
response to new learning."3 4 These models usually include
"hybrid public-private governance structures, emphasizing
broad information-sharing, systematic performance
monitoring, and collaborative problem-solving among parties
representing diverse interests at multiple, nested spatial
scales .... "I
Efforts like the Chesapeake Bay Program 6 and the
South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Project'3 7 are examples
132. Christensen et al., supra note 130, at 665.
133. Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 201; see Frampton, supra note 15, at 42-46;
Oran R. Young, Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of
Cross-Scale Interactions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, 263, 263-66 (Elinor
Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
134. Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 193; see generally Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs
IV The Final Frontier, 29 ELR 10,469 (1999).
135. Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 193-94.
136. In the Chesapeake Bay Program, the Chesapeake Bay Commission, the
coordinating group for the Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania legislatures, was
a founding member and remains a leading participant in the Chesapeake
Executive Council, the central coordinating institution that also includes top state
and federal executive branch authorities. Collaborative agreements reached
through this region-wide coordinating mechanism inform and constrain the
legislative agendas in each of the state legislatures, even as they inform and
constrain the executive branch's exercise of a wide range of discretionary
executive and administrative powers. See, e.g., CHESAPEAKE 2000,
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp-12081.pdf (last visited
Apr. 27, 2014).
137. In the Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Congress established the
South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task Force, which consists of fourteen
members "who coordinate the development of consistent policies, strategies,
plans, programs, projects, activities, and priorities addressing the restoration,
preservation, and protection of the South Florida ecosystem." The Task Force
writes annual reports, which provides the basis for ecosystem management and
the integration of management across scales and entities. See About Us, U.S. DOI
OFFICE OF EVERGLADES RESTORATION INITIATIVES, SOUTH FLORIDA ECOSYSTEM
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of "large regional or 'landscape' scale ecosystem management
efforts" that showcase the success and adaptability of diverse
experimentation.' These complex and hybrid governance
structures tend to involve "high levels of both vertical,
horizontal, and functional coordination" across federal-state-
local tiers of government, agencies, and non-governmental
parties.'3 9
Some lessons can be adapted to policy-making on
extreme weather events based on the success of these
approaches to ecosystem management. By integrating scales,
international efforts can "pool[] a richly diverse mix of policy
relevant information derived from various angles of vision
[local to global], and reflecting various degrees of
resolution." 4 0 Because of the hybrid governance structure,
there is tremendous opportunity for "pooling a rich and
diverse array of resources and capacities" (financial,
expertise, etc.) under a "single institutional umbrella,
[which] frequently finds expression in the form of frequent
face-to-face interactions, combined databases and electronic
information management systems, and regular . . .
interdepartmental working relationships." 4 1 Although an
idealized construction, this collaborative regime certainly
holds distinct advantages over conventional rivals as a
mechanism for tackling the complexities and cross-border
nature of climate change.142 By -adopting these integrated
strategies to the global policy sphere, policy-makers and
scientists may find greater synergisms between issues of
spatial scale, collective action, and scientific uncertainty.
RESTORATION TASK FORCE, http://www.sfrestore.org/about_us.html (last visited
Apr. 27, 2014); see also South Florida Ecosystem Restoration: Scientific
Information Needs, SOUTH FLORIDA INFORMATION ACCESS (Carole Goodyear ed.,
1996), available at http://sofia.usgs.gov/publications/reports/sci-infoneeds/#full.
138. Karkkainen, supra note 13, at 210.
139. Id. at 226.
140. Id. at 223.
141. Id. at 219.
142. Id.
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2. Local Intervention in the Face of Scientific
Uncertainty? Some Successes
In the extreme weather events context, the increased
uncertainty at the local level is very high, yet a number of
local public and private actors have attempted to implement
prevention and remediation schemes in the face of inaction
at the national or international levels. One such example is
the initiative undertaken by a farming community in
Rajasthan (India) to curb the impacts of extreme weather.
Farmers in the Rajasthan region reported experiencing
changes in terms of increasing temperatures and decreasing
precipitation during the monsoon season.143 Because the
community's livelihood was at stake, farmers were unable to
wait for implementation of a national mitigation strategy to
heed the effects of climate change.1" In response, farmers
implemented several sustainable farming practices such as
using more drought-resistant indigenous seeds rather than
hybrid seeds, shifting crop patterns to species requiring less
water, shifting sowing periods according to the weather,
reintroducing native drought-resistant grasses for pasturing,
and employing sustainable water management techniques. 145
The project is a remarkable example of how small-scale
techniques can benefit a whole village, even in the face of
erratic and undependable weather. A major part of the
success of these small-scale applications is due to the
preliminary work of the village committee, allowing for well-
directed interventions and less dependency on high cost
inputs and increased reliance on locally available
resources.146
A higher-level policy intervention would be to collect the
data regarding such local interventions and create a
repository that can be accessed by others facing similar
143. Poonam Pande, Adaptation of Small Scale Farmers to Climatic Risks in
India 20-21 (Sustainet India 2005), http://www.sustainet.org/download/
Adaptation-in-Indiajong.pdf.
144. Id. at 25-26.
145. Id. at 26-29.
146. Kaspar Akermann, How do Farmers Respond to Climate Change in
Rajasthan?, 43 RuRAL 21, 30,32 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.rural21.com/
uploads/media/R21 How dosmall farmersrespond... 0409.pdf.
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constraints. Rather than simply narrative case studies, the
resource could take the form of a searchable database that
organizes human activities and inputs based on their
resistance or vulnerability to particular types of extreme
events. This would be useful for multilateral development
agencies, which could act as the knowledge dissemination
vector to assist local communities in devising effective
policies responding to their specific needs and conditions.
3. Local Interventions that Scale Up?
Because of the scientific uncertainty at increasingly
granular scales, local interventions might be most effective if
they are capable of having an impact beyond the local. Policy
interventions might be easier to implement locally because of
the reduced collective action problem, but because the
extreme weather events might happen elsewhere, some
scaling up in the impact of the intervention would increase
the policy's effectiveness.
In the climate change context, the European Union (EU)
airline emissions trading scheme1 47 is an example of such an
intervention. Aviation contributes to climate change at
regional and global scales through a variety of emissions,
including carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, water vapor,
particulate matter, and other pollutants. 148
Because a significant part of the world's aviation
transits, originates, or arrives in the EU, the group has the
capacity to have an impact on world aviation policy and
emissions in that sector by acting unilaterally. As a
politically integrated unit, the EU has lower collective action
problems compared to what a global negotiation on this issue
would face. Since aviation emissions have an impact beyond
the EU borders, a local intervention may have an impact at
147. EU ETS & Aviation, INT'L EMISSIONS TRADING AsS'N 1 (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.ieta.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=446:eu-
ets--aviation&catid=54:3-minute-briefing&Itemid=135.
148. See also A. Mahashabde et al., Assessing the Environmental Impacts of
Aircraft Noise and Emissions, 47 PROGRESS IN AEROSPACE ScI. 15, 19-21 (2011);
see generally David S. Lee et al., Transport Impacts on Atmosphere and Climate:
Aviation, 44 ATMOSPHERIC ENV'T 4678 (2010).
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the global scale. In this case, the scientific understanding of
airline emissions and their impact is developing, but the
uncertainty is still very high in existing models. 149
Unfortunately, the scheme has now become mired in
international discussions as the United States and China, in
particular, have threatened the EU with retaliatory action if
the latter was to implement the scheme unilaterally.s0 In
response, the EU froze for one year its rule that all airlines
must pay for their carbon emissions for flights into and out
of EU airports in an effort to create a positive atmosphere for
international talks on an alternative global plan to tackle
airline emissions.' The reimplementation of the scheme on
all flights passing through Europe is still contentious, as the
cost for U.S. airlines would be about $3.1 billion through
2020.152 Despite technological advances to reduce airline
emissions, European officials assert that a market-based
system such as the emissions trading scheme is necessary to
create an incentive for airlines to curb their emissions. 53
This scenario illustrates how a unilateral intervention by
a critical mass player can have effects beyond that player.
The collective action problem is reduced, but unlike in the
local mitigation efforts discussed above (farming in
Rajasthan), the positive impact in reduction and mitigation
would be global. The risk posed by unilateralism, however, is
illustrated by the backlash against the EU's decision on
airline emissions and the whole scheme is now at risk of
being lost in the collective action quagmire. In cases where
the spillover effects for third parties are not only positive
149. Nicholas W. Simone, Marc E.J. Stettler & Steven R.H. Barrett, Rapid
Estimation of Global Civil Aviation Emissions with Uncertainty Quantification,
25 TRANSP. RES. PART D: TRANSP. & ENV'T 33, 33 (Dec. 2013), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/piilS1361920913001028#.
150. EU Suspends Extension of Plane Emissions Trading Rules, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-20299388.
151. Barbara Lewis, EU Commission Freezes Airline Carbon Emissions Law,
REUTERS (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/12/eu-airlines-
ets-idUSL5E8MCAAY20121112.
152. James Kanter, E. U. Considers Emission Fines on Chinese and Indian
Airlines, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/
business/global/17iht-emitl7.html?pagewanted=all.
153. Id.
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(reduced emissions), but also negative (costs), pure
unilateralism will be harder to implement. Nonetheless,
where a state or group of states effectively has a monopoly
position (the EU's territory is the monopolistic resource and
airlines will still want to have access to it), there will be a
greater possibility of obtaining third-party compliance.
C. Overcoming Scale: Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty
and Collective Action
In the absence of international or statewide regulations,
a majority of policy interventions have taken place at a mid-
scale level (national or local large region), where both the
collective action problem and the scientific uncertainty are
reduced. For instance, California or the U.S. Eastern
seaboard states face definite vulnerabilities and are able to
mobilize political action more easily than at the federal level.
The downside of such interventions, however, is that they are
typically limited to mitigation and remediation, and typically
are at a scale insufficient to affect climate change, a root
cause of increased adverse events.
In 2012, India surpassed Russia to become the fourth-
leading producer of GHG emissions worldwide, trailing only
the EU, China, and the United States. 15 4 As a nation not
bound by emission targets set by the Kyoto protocol, India
has taken steps on its own to address the impacts of climate
change, especially for those sectors which will be hardest hit
by extreme weather events.' 5 Although primarily driven by
the objective of sustainable livelihood and poverty
alleviation, the Indian government is engaged in "[s]everal
ongoing efforts to promote sustainable agriculture, forestry
and coastal zone development." 66 The 2008 National Action
Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) details the government's
official climate strategy, addressing both adaptation and
154. Global C02 Emissions Reach Record-High, Driven by Fossil Fuel Use in
Rapidly Industrializing Nations, CLEAN TECHNICA (May 25, 2012),
http://cleantechnica.com/2012/05/25/global-co2-emissions-reach-recordhigh-
driven-fossil-fuel-use-rapidly-industrializing-nations.
155. Pande, supra note 143, at 11-12.
156. Id. at 11.
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mitigation issues implemented through various institutional
mechanisms. 5 7 The government of India recognized the need
for a national strategy to not only adapt to climate change,
but to further enhance ecological sustainability as India
continues to rapidly develop.'
Another example of a mid-scale success is the state of
California, which has instituted regional innovative
programs administered at the state level. In 2006, California
passed AB 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,
which set the 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal
into law.'5 9 The Bill "direct[s] the California Air Resources
Board (ARB or Board) to begin developing discrete early
actions to reduce greenhouse gases while also preparing a
scoping plan to identify how best to reach the 2020 limit."60
Most impressively, AB 32 creates a state-wide GHG cap-and-
trade program, which uses market-based mechanisms to
lower greenhouse gas emissions. 16 1 Beginning January 1,
2013, the cap-and-trade rules "apply to large electric power
plants and large industrial plants." 62 In 2015, the program
will extend to cover nearly eighty-five percent of the state's
total greenhouse gas emissions, which will make California's
program second in size only to the EU's emissions trading
system.163 California's experience may serve as a crucial
indicator as to how an economy-wide cap-and-trade system
can function in the United States and potentially globally.'6
Globally, California ranks twelfth to eighteenth in total
emissions, depending on sources.'6 Yet, due to its many
157. Id. at 12.
158. Id. at 11.
159. Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. California Cap and Trade, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/key-legislation/california-cap-trade (last
visited Apr. 27, 2014).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See James Fine & Tim O'Conner, California Cap-and-Trade Program
Frequently Asked Questions, ENvTL. DEF. FUND (Jan. 2012), http://www.
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climate change programs, California has one of the most
efficient developed economies in the world.' 6 6 Its success in
creating this innovative program, which uses virtually the
same mechanisms as Kyoto, demonstrates that while the
collective action problem could not be overcome on the global
scale, California overcame its internal collective action
challenge and was able to act unilaterally at the state level.
Commentators have argued that the United States
should use California's leadership to advance progressive
policies on a national front and extend California's landmark
economy-wide carbon cap-and-trade program to other
states.6 7 Authority for this action comes from the Clean Air
Act'6 8 and, more specifically, from the holding of
Massachusetts v. EPA,169 in which the United States Supreme
edf.org/sites/default/files/EDF-Cap-and-Trade-FAQ-January-2012.pdf; Gregory
Freeman et al., The AB 32 Challenge: Reducing California's Greenhouse Gas
Emissions, L.A. COUNTY ECON. DEV. CORP. (Jan. 2008),
http://www.laedc.org/reports/TheAB32Challenge.pdf.
166. Freeman, supra note 165.
167. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, The President, Climate Change, and California,
126 HARv. L. REV. F. 156, 156 (2013); Mary D. Nichols, California's Climate
Change Policies: Lessons for the Nation, 2010 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 154, 154-
55 (2010).
168. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7601 et seq. (1990).
169. See Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 526, 528, 532 (2007). In light of
scientific research connecting the increase of emissions to global warming, the
state of Massachusetts (among others) petitioned the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate gas emissions from cars in an effort to protect the state's
interest in its coastal lands. Id. at 510. In an administrative decision, the EPA
determined that it lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon
dioxide and other GHGs for climate change purposes. Id. at 528. Massachusetts
appealed the decision and was granted a writ of certiorari. Id. at 506. The
Supreme Court held that the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to regulate
greenhouse gases from vehicle emissions. Id. at 519. The Court made two
important determinations: (1) states were found to have standing as quasi-
sovereigns because of their interest in their costal lands and demonstrated injury
of losing coastal property as the water rises; and (2) the scientific uncertainty
connecting man-made carbon dioxide emissions to global warming was not a valid
reason for the EPA to not regulate a known pollutant. Id. at 523-26, 534. The
Supreme Court may expand these authorities when it reviews Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. E.P.A., 642 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (questioning the
EPA's authority under federal law regulating tailpipe emissions to also regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from statutory sources like power plants).
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Court held that greenhouse gases endanger public health and
welfare.7 0 A successful implementation on a national front,
Carlson argues, would afford the United States the "moral
authority to take a real leadership role on the international
stage, both through the United Nations framework and in
bilateral and multilateral negotiations with other large-
emitting countries."171
The value of these interventions may be as fairly large-
scale policy experimentations. While they might not be big
enough to have a significant global impact directly, they may
be large enough to show that action is possible in reasonably
large, diverse communities without hindering development
or bankrupting the region, such that other regions or states
might in turn decide to take it up. They may also have value
in providing a starting point for others that may want to
observe and then follow suit, such that there might
eventually be a critical mass large enough to have a global
impact.
Based on the framework outlined in this Article, policy-
makers may evaluate the likelihood of successful deployment
of specific policies by using a scientific
uncertainty/scale/collective action matrix. Table 2 illustrates
how some of the proposals presented in this Article might be
evaluated based on that matrix.
170. Carlson, supra note 167, at 157.
171. Id. at 156-57.
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Sensitivity to CollectivePolicy for Scientific Spatial Scale Action
Uncertainty Problem
Global insurance
fund (contributions Low Variable
based on historic sensitivity: Global scale depending how
and current Reliance on implementation, contributions are
emissions or global local scale impact defined
macroeconomic modeling
benchmark?)
Unilateral Low Local to mid- Low
intervention sensitivity scale impact
Global repository Global scale
of local and Low implementation, Low if low cost of
regional best sensitivity multi-scale implementation
practices impact
Higher
Local prevention sensitivity Local scale Low
scheme (but depends
on perception)
Table 2: Evaluating Policies under a Scientific Uncertainty/Scale/Collective
Action Matrix: Some Illustrations
CONCLUSION
In an ideal world, a successful policy in the climate
change realm is one that has a low collective problem, is
implemented on a global scale with a global reach, and has a
low sensitivity to scientific uncertainty. As demonstrated by
the literature survey and case studies above, there have been
few, if any, policies that meet this ideal policy model. History
shows that large-scale policies that incorporate science with
a low sensitivity to uncertainty have been ineffective due to
a collective action problem; whereas policy-makers are
typically more able to overcome coordination problems at the
local level, despite the much higher degree of uncertainty in
the science. A recent high-profile U.S. government report on
climate change in the United States recognizes that policy-
making for adaptation to and mitigation of extreme events
takes place at the state, tribal, and local government level. It
2014] TAKING CLIMATE CHANGE BY STORM
also notes the need to help policy-makers understand state-
of-the-art scientific information on climate change trends.'7 2
Nonetheless, the report's continued expectation that
decision-making can be crafted in reaction to ever-improving
science models' misses the fundamental point of the
increased uncertainty at granular scales, combined with the
low chance that such uncertainty will reduce in the near
future.
Our goal, then, is to encourage policy-makers to approach
extreme weather policy while considering how the factors of
scientific uncertainty, spatial scale, and the problem of
collective action work together. The hope is that policy
attempts (both successes and failures) become part of a
repository for future policy-makers so that mistakes are not
repeated and the collective action problem may eventually
become obsolete.
172. U.S. Third National Climate Assessment, supra note 1, at 634 ("There is
also a need for 'science translators' who can help decision-makers efficiently
access and properly use data and tools that would be helpful in making more
informed decisions in the context of climate change.").
173. Id. at 635 ("Probabilistic forecasts or other information regarding
consequential climate extremes/events have the potential to be very useful for
decision-makers, if used with improving information on the consequences of
climate change and appropriate decision supporting tools.").
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